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The tone and readability of the media during the financial crisis: 
Evidence from pre-IPO media coverage 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior research suggests that in an IPO market, where investors have little knowledge of IPO 
companies, the media plays a vital role in facilitating or inhibiting the process of impression 
formation. This paper examines the tone and readability of the media for IPO companies 
during the global financial crisis to understand the role of the media when the economic 
environment is uncertain. Our findings suggest that the tone but not the readability of the 
media varies under different market conditions. In particular, we find that the tone in the 
media is more favourable in good times, less so in bad. We suggest that the media is aware of 
the fact that positive (negative) news articles are more (less) likely to increase retail demand 
for a stock and, thus, try to hedge their bets during the crisis period and do not want to create 
unnecessary attention in an uncertain environment.  
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1. Introduction  
 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is considered to be a very significant event in the lifecycle of 
a company (Latham & Braun, 2010). Firms participating in an IPO are subject to numerous 
regulatory restrictions that prohibit them from certain activities while the company is in its 
registration period (Bradley, Jordan & Ritter, 2003).  
In the US, the SEC regulates the disclosure of information by IPO firms during the IPO 
process. During the registration process, the SEC also restricts issuers, company insiders, 
analysts, and other parties from promoting the upcoming IPO. This quiet period restriction, 
coupled with the fact that such firms are still in their early periods of legitimising and 
therefore are largely unknown to retail investors, may lead to information asymmetry 
between issuers and investors. This puts the firm in a critical stage wherein it becomes 
difficult to establish an appropriate value for such an untried firm, especially for retail 
investors, implying the crucial role other sources such as media can play in facilitating 
information about the less known companies. This role can be even more important when 
there is an economic downturn such as a financial crisis.  
Indeed, prior research (e.g. Bushee, Cedergren & Michels, 2017) shows that, during 
the ‘quiet period’, media plays a significant role for retail investors and such purchases are 
attention-driven rather than information based. In this paper, we provide novel evidence on 
how the pre-IPO media attributes (tone and readability) vary across different market 
conditions. Unlike other papers in this area, our paper examines the tone and readability of 
the pre-IPO media coverage when firms are still in the initial stages of legitimising, are 
largely unknown to retail investors and the economic environment is not favourable. This is 
where our contribution lies.  
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The sample consists of 76 news articles published between 2006 and 2009 for IPO 
companies listed on the NYSE. The time period was chosen to use the financial crisis as a 
natural experimental setting to examine the readability and tone of the media.  
We find that the tone but not readability of the media changes under different market 
conditions. In particular, the media is more positive during the non-crisis period but more 
negative during the crisis period. We suggest that the media try to hedge their bets for less 
known companies in a difficult economic environment and try not to be positive which might 
create unnecessary attention for companies with little track record and incomplete 
information, especially among uninformed investors. Our empirical results suggest no 
variations in readability in the media with changing market conditions. Overall, we conclude 
that the media is more favourable in good times, less so in bad.  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in many ways. Numerous papers are 
available on market reaction and tone of annual and analysts’ reports, but less so on the 
media which should be an important source of information for uninformed investors, 
especially for IPO companies during the global financial crisis. Indeed, prior research 
suggests that in an IPO market, where uninformed investors have little knowledge of IPO 
stocks, the media plays a vital role in facilitating or inhibiting the process of impression 
formation (Bushee et al. 2017; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). They also suggest that publicly 
available information on IPO firms not only enhances the legitimacy of IPO firms but also 
influences retail investor behaviour towards them. The impression formation process for IPO 
firms is highly critical as sufficient positive attention drawn towards the firm in the market is 
crucial for driving up the demand for its shares. 
Second, our paper is timely for standard setters and the overall financial market. The 
lack of transparency in private exchanges (e.g. SharesPost and SecondMarket) for IPO stocks 
has drawn significant attention in the past, enhancing the requirement of an alternative 
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disclosure vehicle for IPO stocks. Since retail investors are desperate to obtain stocks such as 
Facebook, Twitter and Snap, they resort to trading these stocks before the company even goes 
public. This raises concern on how stocks are valued before the relevant data for the company 
is even available. The SEC is also concerned about secret commissions, hidden charges and 
investors being misled (WSJ, 2012).  
Finally, our findings on the tone of the media during the crisis period shed light on the 
need for firms to take into account the importance of scheduling an IPO while carefully 
considering the state of the market. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature and 
our predictions. Section 3 provides a discussion of research design followed by the results in 
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.	
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2.0 Prior Research and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Prior Research	
Prior research on IPOs and investor sentiment often makes a distinction between informed 
and uninformed investors where large institutional investors are seen as informed investors 
and individual retail investors as uninformed (Rock, 1986; Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; 
Keloharju & Torstila, 2002). Indeed, investors require resources and sophistication to analyse 
the value of an IPO and it is of no surprise that large institutional investors are considered as 
informed investors. These informed investors are able to better access the long- term value of 
the issuer whereas uninformed investors face the adverse selection problem.1 Rock (1986) 
suggests that since uninformed investors are at an informational disadvantage compared to 
informed investors, they have the risk of gaining access to only low profit or unprofitable 
offerings. Derrien (2005) and Cornelli, Goldreich & Ljungqvist (2006), among others, 
theoretically show that issuers can take advantage of retail and sentiment investors. 	
In this regard, media plays an important role in facilitating (inhibiting) impressions of 
new companies about which uninformed investors lack firm-specific knowledge and face the 
risk of acquiring a large share of bad deals (Bushee et al. 2017; Engelberg & Parsons, 2011; 
Blankespoor, Haan & Zhu, 2017). Suchman (1995) concludes that by altering the levels of 
investor exposure to information about IPO companies and by framing this information 
positively or negatively, the media is capable of rendering some firms more desirable and 
comprehensible.2 	
																																								 																				
1 Malakhov (2013) suggests that informed investors are assumed to behave as an ‘exclusive club’ by colluding 
to protect their private information about the IPO value. On the other hand, uninformed investors help the issuer 
to better extract valuable pricing information from informed investors. 	
2 See Liu, Sherman & Zhang (2014) for evidence of the influence of media on investor sentiment. 
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It is of little surprise that so much attention has been given in the literature to the 
impact of the media on financial markets (Cook, Kieschnick & Ness, 2006; Bhattacharya, 
Galpin, Ray & Yu, 2009; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky & Macskassy, 2008; Fang 
& Peress, 2009; Li, Ramesh & Shen, 2011; Dougal, Engelberg, Garcia & Parsons, 2012; 
Peress, 2014; Rogers, Skinner & Zechman, 2016; Blankespoor et al. 2017 among others)3. 
Prior research suggests that the media provides useful information to readers and helps to 
shape the expectations of market participants including investors. For instance, Kothari, Li & 
Short (2009) confirm that negative (positive) disclosures from the business press result in 
increased (reduced) cost of capital and return volatility. Similarly, Tetlock (2010) suggests 
that media content can serve as a proxy for investor sentiment. Tetlock (2010) also confirms 
that there is a significant effect of the tone used by influential market participants on stock 
prices. Specifically, he establishes the occurrence of a negative market reaction to pessimistic 
articles published in a Wall Street Journal column. Expanding on this concept, there has been 
a surge of research examining the significance of tone in shaping market reactions. Bushee, 
Core, Guay & Hamm (2010) confirm that the press serves a role in reducing information 
problems related to earnings announcements. Moreover, Wisniewski & Lambe (2012) find 
that journalists not only report on the state of economic reality during economic stress, but 
also play an active role in creating it. This shows that the media, which can serve as a proxy 
for investor sentiment, plays an important role in influencing the cost of issuing equity which 
has a direct effect on IPO volume.4 	
																																								 																				
3  Extant literature also shows how social structures enhance the flow of credible information to market 
participants to reduce the uncertainty of financial markets (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Zuckerman, 1999). Much 
research is also available on how information intermediaries, such as financial analysts and the media, influence 
these markets (Deephouse, 2000; Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001). 	
4 Prior research also suggests that the media should be less prone to bias and optimism. For instance, Kothari et 
al. (2009) suggest that management and investment analysts can have strong incentives to optimistically skew 
disclosures, whereas news reporters’ incentives to be optimistic in their reports are muted. In particular, they 
suggest that the credibility of media disclosures is higher than the credibility of disclosures made by company or 
financial analysts. In line with this, Li (2008) also confirms that the measures derived from content analysis for 
corporate disclosures are more likely to be noisy than those from the business press. 
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There is considerable research on the market timing of IPO suggesting both 
exogenous economic conditions and a firm’s financing needs can influence an IPO decision. 
For example, Benninga, Helmantel & Sarig (2005) conclude that investment financing is not 
the only reason to launch an IPO. Likewise, Lowry (2003) suggests that economic recovery 
and investor optimism can encourage a corporation to launch an IPO. In particular, Lowry 
(2003) concludes that the IPO market serves as an economic indicator in both practice and 
academia due to its proven pro-cyclical nature. Accordingly, IPOs experience a hot market 
characterised by an increased number of firms going public and increased proceeds during an 
economic expansion, while during a recession, there are low levels of IPO activity, i.e., cold 
markets. Other studies (Dittmar & Thakor, 2006) also suggest that companies exploit 
favourable market conditions. Ernst &Young (2010) shows a considerable level of fluctuation 
in the number of IPO deals in the given time frame, i.e., a massive slump in the number of 
deals and amount of capital raised in 2008-09 as compared to the years directly preceding and 
succeeding them. This fluctuation is far in excess of the fluctuation in capital expenditures, 
indicating the presence of factors other than financing requirements to have a substantial 
effect on the timing of a firm’s IPO (Lowry, 2003).5 	
Research on the role of media under different market conditions (e.g., internet bubble, 
financial crisis) is rare. While Shiller (2000) concludes that the media hype was a major 
factor responsible for the internet bubble, Bhattacharya et al. (2009) find that the media was 
more positive (negative) for internet IPOs in the period of dramatic rise (fall) in share prices. 
In summary, while prior research provides substantial evidence on the important role of the 
media during the IPO process and the importance of exogenous economic conditions for IPO 
firms, there is lack of evidence on how pre-IPO media tone and readability vary across 
different economic conditions. 
																																								 																				
5 Lee, Shleifer & Thaler (1991) conclude that variations in investor sentiment have a significant impact on IPO 
volume. Also see Ritter & Welch (2002) for a review. 
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2.2 Hypotheses 
 
Prior research suggests that by framing information on IPO stocks positively or 
negatively, the media is capable of rendering some firms more desirable and comprehensible 
(Suchman, 1995). Liu et al. (2014) find that pre-IPO media coverage is essential for a firm’s 
information environment, enhancing its long-term value, liquidity, analysts’ coverage and 
institutional ownership. The ‘information hypothesis’ suggests that positive news stories are 
most likely to trigger purchasing and, by contrast, negative news stories are less likely to 
increase retail demand for a stock. On the other hand, the ‘attention hypothesis’ suggests that 
both positive and negative news events should prompt retail buying.6  
Shiller (2000) claims that the media hyped internet stocks during the dot.com bubble 
and this media hype was a major factor responsible for the dramatic rise and fall of internet 
stocks. He suggests that stocks price increases in the late 1990s were driven by irrational 
euphoria among individual investors and fed by an emphatic media, which catered to investor 
demand for pseudo-news (also see Bhattacharya et al. 2009). Because of the huge criticism in 
the recent past, it is not surprising that media will be more risk averse to avoid such criticism, 
especially when the market condition is poor. They should also be aware of the fact that it 
might create unnecessary attention to uninformed investors like the dot.com bubble. We 
therefore develop the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: The pre-IPO media tone is more positive (negative) during non-crisis (crisis) periods. 
 
While recent evidence suggests that media is important for investor sentiment in an 
IPO market, prior research also suggests that the effect of language sentiment (tone) is 
																																								 																				
6 Barber and Odean (2008) suggest that attention-driven trade responds to the visibility of news articles but not 
the content. 
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conditional on readability. For instance, Tan, Wang & Zhou (2014) suggest that when 
readability is high, the substance of a disclosure can be easily understood and the language 
sentiment is less likely to have an impact on investor judgement, irrespective of investor 
sophistication. On the other hand, when the readability is low, language sentiment can have a 
marked effect on investor judgement, with the directional effect varying depending on 
investor sophistication level (Tan et al. 2014). 
Understandability of disclosure is an important aspect for regulators. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) states, in its conceptual framework, that 
comparability, verifiability, timeliness and understandability are qualitative characteristics 
that enhance the usefulness of information (IASB, 2010). The IASB states,  
 
Classifying, characterising and presenting information clearly and concisely makes it 
understandable. While some phenomena are inherently complex and cannot be made 
easy to understand, to exclude such information would make financial reports 
incomplete and potentially misleading. Financial reports are prepared for users who 
have a reasonable knowledge of business and economic activities and who review and 
analyse the information with diligence. 
 
In the US, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, in its conceptual framework, 
clearly states that information should be presented clearly and concisely to make it 
understandable. Equally, the SEC requires companies to follow plain English principles in 
order to facilitate investor understanding.  
Empirical evidence suggests that companies do act in an opposite direction by 
providing low readability text. Li (2008) and Bloomfield (2008) suggest that managers 
provide low readability disclosures to obfuscate investors which ultimately results in reduced 
trading behaviour, smaller valuation change and muted investor reactions (You & Zhang 
2009; Miller, 2010; Rennekamp, 2012). This must be a concern for uninformed investors, 
especially when there is more uncertainty about the market outlook and performance of 
companies. Likewise, we expect that the media provides more complex/ambiguous news 
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articles during the crisis period because of uncertain economic environment. Therefore, we 
develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Pre-IPO media articles are less (more) complex during non-crisis (crisis) periods. 
 
3. Empirical measures and research design 
 
We conduct a comprehensive content analysis to develop objective and reliable measures for 
the tone and readability of news articles. Tone is measured by manually classifying assertions 
made in news articles as favourable and unfavourable. The Janis-Fadner coefficient of 
imbalance which provides a measure of the overall tenor of media coverage (Pollock & 
Rindova, 2003; Deephouse, 2000; Janis & Fadner, 1965) was used to measure the tenor of the 
media. Readability is evaluated in terms of complexity using a commonly used measure of 
writing sophistication developed by Robert Gunning called the Gunning Fog Index. We are 
particularly interested to understand the readability of the media during the crisis and non-
crisis period since prior research (Tan et al. 2014) suggests that the effect of language 
sentiment on investor judgement is conditional on readability. In line with Baginski, Demers, 
Kausar & Yu (2018) and Tan et al. (2014), since our sample media articles are readable 
(discussed later), we do not expect any differential impact of readability on tone between 
informed and uninformed investors.  
	
3.1 Sample 
 
Our sample consists of 76 news articles for 10 IPO stocks. The sample for the study 
was drawn from companies that listed on the NYSE between 2006 and 2009. The time frame 
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was chosen in order to analyse the impact of crisis on the reporting of media. We used 
Factiva and Lexis Nexis as main data sources for the articles. Approximately 48% of the 
news articles were taken from the Financial Times and the rest from Factiva which includes 
vendors such as Reuters, Dow Jones and the Wall Street Journal.  
Panel A of Table 1 shows the sample selection process. Only news articles that were 
published within six months prior to the company’s IPO date were taken. Companies with a 
minimum of two news articles available for the pre-IPO period were taken in the sample. 
Overall, 103 articles were collected and content analysed. Articles that simply discussed facts 
and figures such as IPO dates, list of underwriters without any analysis or not directly related 
to the company were excluded from the sample. Panel B of Table 1 shows the composition of 
the sample with respect to the industry each company belongs to and the number of articles 
analysed for that company. The sample includes companies from six industries: Basic 
Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Financials, Technology and 
Telecommunications. Under this classification, the sample contains five companies with IPO 
dates falling in the non-crisis period and five companies with IPO dates falling in the crisis 
period. In terms of the number of articles, 33 articles were analysed from the non-crisis 
period and 43 articles were analysed from the crisis period. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
To classify our sample into the non-crisis and crisis categories, an investigation of the 
important financial events that led to the global financial crisis was undertaken. Figure 1 
shows the timeline of events that led to the global financial crisis.  
According to Bloomberg, the timeline highlighting key dates of the financial 
meltdown which led to the global financial crisis suggests that one of the first signs that the 
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US housing market was turning sour was demonstrated on 8th February 2007 when HSBC 
revealed huge losses at its US mortgage arm. The second event magnifying the oncoming of 
the meltdown took place on 2nd April 2007 when New Century, a subprime lender filed for 
bankruptcy. On 9th August 2007, French bank BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from 
three hedge funds. This sent credit markets into free-fall. This timeline is consistent with 
earlier studies such as Arand & Kerl (2012). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.2 Tone measure 
 
The relevant content of each of the articles was identified and the assertions found in 
it were labelled as favourable (F) or unfavourable (U) as given in Appendix I. The tenor for 
each article was then calculated as positive, negative or neutral based on the number of 
favourable and unfavourable assertions. The number of positive articles (P), negative articles 
(N) and total articles (V) were noted for each company and used as inputs to the Janis- 
Fadner equation.7  
This method is widely used in media-related research to assess the degree of media 
favourability (Deephouse, 2000; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). It measures the relative 
proportion of articles that have a positive tenor versus those with a negative tenor while 
controlling for the overall volume of articles for each company.  
																																								 																				
7 The Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance is given by the following equation: !"#!$%" 	'(	!)$;+	'(	!,$,./0	1232"4" 	56	172 
where P is the number of positive articles about a firm, N is the number of negative articles and V is the total 
volume of articles, including articles that are neutral in tenor. The range of this variable is -1 to 1, where -1 
equals all negative coverage and 1 equals all positive coverage. 
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In this study, news articles published by the media serve as the units of content that 
are classified on the basis of positive, negative and neutral tone which are then used as inputs 
to the Janis-Fadner equation. To arrive at the Janis-Fadner coefficient for each pre-IPO stock 
the following steps were carried out.  
Step 1: The entire content of a news article was treated as the total content. The news 
article was then analysed to capture the relevant content, i.e., content which contained 
favourable or unfavourable assertions. The relevant content then consisted of the number of 
favourable and unfavourable assertions and was a subset of the total content. 
Step 2: In the relevant content, if the favourable assertions outnumbered the 
unfavourable assertions, the total content (news article) was identified as positive. If the 
unfavourable assertions outnumbered the favourable assertions, the news article was 
identified as negative. If the number of favourable assertions and unfavourable assertions 
were equal in number, the news article was identified as neutral. 
Step 3: For each company, the number of positive, negative and neutral articles were 
then calculated and used as inputs to the Janis-Fadner equation. 
For analysing tone in each news article, we also examine: Number of favourable 
assertions8 raised in the article (F); number of unfavourable assertions raised in the article 
(U); and Tenor of the article where T is inferred as Positive if favourable assertions exceed 
unfavourable assertions and vice versa. 
The key features of the Janis-Fadner coefficient in this paper are: i) When, for a firm, 
there is an equal number of positive and negative articles, the coefficient has a meaningful 
zero value; ii) The coefficient has a positive (negative) value for firms that have a higher 
proportion of positive (negative) news articles; iii) When the number of positive (negative) 
																																								 																				
8 We also analysed the assertions identified in each article as positive or negative based on the following set of 
rules: i) Paragraphs merely stating facts are not included in the analysis; ii) Paragraphs containing statistical 
estimates are not accounted for in a positive or negative light; iii) IPO related statistics such as the proceeds, the 
shares being floated, price revisions, ticker and exchange on which the stock will be listed are not included in 
the analysis.  
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tenor articles increases, the coefficient increases (decreases); and iv) When the number of 
articles increases, the coefficient decreases to adjust for the lower proportion of positive or 
negative articles that are now present.9 
 
 
3.3 Readability Measure 
 
Readability is broadly defined as the ease with which content can be read and 
understood. This study uses the degree of complexity as a measure of readability of news 
articles. To measure complexity, we use the Gunning Fog Index 10 that has been used 
extensively in computational linguistics literature, and has also gained prominence among 
accounting and finance researchers (Li, 2008; Biddle, Gilles & Rodrigo, 2009; Lehavy, Li & 
Merkley, 2011; Callen, Khan & Lu, 2013). We calculated the Gunning Fog Index (G-F) value 
for each article and the average complexity (A-C) of new articles for each company which is 
the average of the Fog Index values of all news articles available for that company during that 
period. 
A key advantage of using the Fog Index is that it quantifies the measure of writing 
complexity in an objective and reliable way (Twedt & Rees, 2012). It is expected that a 
																																								 																				
9 The coefficient of imbalance can be used to provide a measure of a certain trait provided the units of the 
content under analysis can be classified according to the occurrence of the particular trait, occurrence of its 
opposite trait and non-occurrence of the trait (Janis & Fadner, 1965). 
10 The Gunning Fog Index is used to measure the complexity of text and uses a readability formula which was 
developed by Robert Gunning in 1952. It measures the writing sophistication as a function of syllables per word 
and words per sentence and therefore provides an approximation of the years of education a reader requires in 
order to understand the text. The Gunning Fog Index calculates the readability of text by using the given 
formula: 𝐺 − 𝐹	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0.4 ∗ { 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 + 	100 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥	𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 } 
where complex words are defined as words with three or more syllables. The output is a number and can be 
interpreted with respect to the Fog Index of 12 which requires the reading level of a US high school senior. A 
Fog Index below 12 is considered easy, in the range of 12–14 is considered average, 14–18 is relatively difficult, 
and above 18 indicates the document is unreadable (Gunning, 1968).  
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highly complex news article may signal a tendency to distract the reader from value-relevant 
information. 
To provide additional evidence on the effect of crisis on the complexity of news 
articles, we also used the Flesch Reading Ease and Flesch-Kincaid Indexes – two other 
measures of writing complexity that have gained popularity (Dubay, 2007; Li, 2008). Similar 
to the Fog Index, the Kincaid Index calculates a grade level which is necessary for 
comprehension of a text. The Flesch Reading Ease Index, on the other hand, rates text on a 
scale of 100, with less complex text mapping to higher values. In order to make the 
interpretations of the various measures comparable, the Flesch Reading Ease Index is 
multiplied by -1 so that all measures represent higher complexity with larger values.	 The 
Flesch Reading Ease Formula is a simple approach to assess the grade-level of the reader 
although it has some limitations such as words of three letters or shorter count as single 
syllables and consecutive vowels count as one syllable.  
 
 
 
	
4. Findings 
 
4.1 Tone 
 
Table 2 presents the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance for each of the 10 
companies in the sample. For the non-crisis period a total of 33 news articles were analysed 
for the five pre-IPO stocks. The Janis-Fadner coefficient was positive for all five stocks 
indicating high media favourability for the stocks. In the crisis period, 43 news articles were 
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analysed. The Janis-Fadner coefficient was found to be negative for all stocks with the 
exception of one (i.e., VMware). 
For the non-crisis period, the mean and median value of the Janis-Fadner coefficient 
is 0.28 and 0.18 respectively, indicating significant favourable (or positive) coverage for the 
pre-IPO stocks. The standard deviation of the pre-IPO stocks covered in the non-crisis period 
is low when compared to the crisis period. Table 2 also shows that the mean and median 
values of the Janis-Fadner coefficient for all stocks in the crisis period is -0.11 and -0.23 
respectively, indicating a decline in positive views by the media and an increase in negative 
views. There is also a larger standard deviation in the Janis-Fadner coefficient of these stocks 
indicating a larger variation in the Janis-Fadner coefficients during the crisis. This implies 
that the media tend to be more varied during the crisis, while showing both extreme ends of 
media favourability (i.e., Janis-Fadner coefficient of 1 for VMware) and media 
unfavourability (i.e., Janis Fadner coefficient of -1 for Cloud Peak Energy). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We also observed some interesting patterns in the individual company data. For 
example, Fortress Investment Group and Blackstone had their IPOs in February and June of 
2007 respectively. The volume of articles (V) analysed for Fortress Investment Group was 
four. The Janis-Fadner coefficient of the company was 0.56, indicating a relatively high 
degree of media favourability. The number of favourable assertions (F) altogether in the four 
news articles was four for the company. No negative assertions (U) were observed. On the 
other hand, Blackstone had coverage of 18 news articles with a Janis-Fadner coefficient of -
0.32, indicating more negative media coverage was drawn to its IPO. Overall, 30 of the 48 
assertions were negative.  
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Table 3 shows a breakdown of the overall number of positive, neutral and negative 
articles in the non-crisis and crisis periods. In the non-crisis period, 55% of the articles were 
analysed as positive and 18% as negative. During the crisis period, although the number of 
positive articles dropped from 55% to 37%, the number of negative articles increased from 
18% to 40%. 11 The ch-square statistic (x2 =4.0586, p= 0.043946) shows a significance 
difference across two periods at 5% level. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 shows the number of positive and negative assertions raised in the relevant 
content of the articles during non-crisis and crisis periods. A total of 97 assertions were 
identified in the 33 articles analysed for the non-crisis period and 113 assertions were 
identified in the 43 articles analysed for the crisis period. In the non-crisis period the positive 
assertions were 30% more than the negative assertions and in the crisis period, the positive 
assertions were only 6% less than the negative assertions. The ch-square statistic (x2= 7.6985, 
p= 0.005527) shows a significance difference across two periods at 5% level. 
On the other hand, of the 33 news articles analysed for the non-crisis period, only 38 
unfavourable assertions were raised compared to 60 non-favourable assertions in the 43 news 
articles analysed in the crisis period. This suggests an increase of 0.25 negative assertions per 
news article, i.e., from 1.15 negative assertions per news article in the non-crisis period to 
																																								 																				
11 We also observed (unreported) that the number of articles with a neutral tenor remained almost the same 
across two periods. 
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1.40 negative assertions per news article in the crisis period. Overall, this signals a nominal 
increase in the negative views in the media during the crisis period. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Furthermore, for an article with a positive tenor, the number of positive assertions 
outnumbered the negative assertions by a higher number during non-crisis as compared to 
crisis. For example, in the non-crisis period, six articles were marked positive because the 
positive assertions outnumbered the negative assertions by more than two. Conversely, in the 
crisis period the positive assertions outnumbered the negative assertions by more than two 
only once. This, overall, indicates a higher degree of favourability in the non-crisis news 
articles as compared to the news articles published in the crisis period.  
Similarly, for a negative tenor article, the number of negative assertions outnumbered 
the positive assertions by more than a difference of one on five occasions during the non-
crisis and 11 occasions during the crisis period. This indicates a higher degree of 
unfavourability in the news articles published during the crisis period as compared to the 
news articles published in the non-crisis period.  
Following the empirical observations given above, it can be inferred in favour of H1 
that pre-media coverage is more favourable for IPO stocks during the non-crisis period. First, 
the highly positive Janis-Fadner coefficients of imbalance for each of the IPO stocks in the 
non-crisis period suggest high media favourability. Second, the percentage of news articles 
that are positive for the non-crisis period is significantly higher than the percentage of 
positive articles found in the crisis period.  Third, the number of positive assertions per news 
article is much higher for the crisis period as compared to the non-crisis period. Fourth, for 
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positive articles, the positive assertions outnumbered the negative assertions by a higher 
amount in the non-crisis period as compared to the crisis period.  
In contrast, the observations also suggest a significant decline in media favourability 
during a crisis period, except for VMware.12 Furthermore, the number of negative articles 
was only 3% more than the number of positive articles in the crisis. The number of negative 
assertions per news article increased by 0.25 during the crisis as compared to the non-crisis 
period.  
	
4.2 Readability 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the average complexity (A-C) of the news articles 
published for each company during crisis and non-crisis periods. The values appear to be 
similar and fall within the average reading level with the exception of Vonage Holdings 
which falls into the category of relatively difficult readability. Seven news articles were 
analysed for Vonage Holdings of which five have a Gunning Fog index value of greater than 
14.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the Gunning Fog Index (F-I). 
The mean average complexity for all news articles published in the non-crisis period is 12.33 
and in the crisis period is 12.57. Both these values are considered to be of an average 
readability level. The medians of both periods also fall within the average readability level. 
The variation in the complexities of the news articles across both the periods is also 
																																								 																				
12 VMware is a US company that provides cloud and virtualization software and services. A Janis-Fadner 
coefficient of 1 for VMware may be explained by the nature of its business as virtualization is one of the fast 
growing areas in the technology sector. 
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insignificant as is demonstrated by the low standard deviation values. As seen in the table, 
75% of the news articles fall below the 13.47 Fog index for the non-crisis period and 13.98 
for the crisis period indicating the 75th percentile of the complexity values for both the 
periods falls within the average readability level. Furthermore, only 1% of the articles fall 
below the 8.08 Fog index level for the non-crisis period and below 8.34 for the crisis period 
indicating only a very small number of articles are less readable. Overall, we suggest that the 
news articles used in the sample are not overly complex and fall within the average 
readability levels. Overall, we did not find any support for H2, i.e., no evidence of varying 
levels of readability of the media across two periods. 
 The results of all the complexity measures used to analyse the news articles during 
non-crisis and crisis periods are presented in Table 6. The mean values for Flesch Reading 
Ease (F-R) and Flesch Kincaid (F-K) indexes fall within the average complexity range for 
both non-crisis and crisis periods, indicating a nearly identical result to the primary measure 
of complexity.  
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
	
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Prior research suggests that media can help retail or uninformed investors by generating and 
disseminating information about IPO companies with little track record (Bushee et al. 2017). 
We have limited understanding on how the pre-IPO media tone and readability vary during 
crisis and non-crisis periods. This paper presents interesting evidence of the readability and 
tone of the media during the last global financial crisis. The tone of the media while reporting 
for IPO stocks is hypothesised to be more positive during periods of non-crisis and more 
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negative during crisis. Readability is predicted to be less complex during periods of non-crisis 
and more complex during crisis. 
Consistent with the predictions made for tone, media coverage is observed to be 
significantly positive during periods of non-crisis and negative during crisis. We do not find 
evidence of varying levels of readability of the media while reporting for IPO companies with 
changes in the market conditions. These results are continually observed using alternative 
measures of readability as well.  
We believe the media tend to hedge their bets during the crisis period by providing 
more negative views as there is uncertainty in the market. More positive views might create 
excess attention which might be harmful for informed and uninformed investors alike. One 
plausible reason for this risk-averse attitude is due to the fact that the media is aware of the 
heavy criticisms they faced during the dot.com bubble (Shiller, 2000). This is also in line 
with the ‘information hypothesis’ (see Bushee et al. 2017), i.e., positive news stories are most 
likely to trigger purchasing and, by contrast, negative news stories are less likely to increase 
retail demand for a stock. We also find average readability of news articles which we 
interpret as an attempt from the media not to make it complex to uninformed retail investors 
across both periods and a tendency not to distract the reader from the information conveyed 
in the news articles. Overall, we conclude that, at least during the crisis period, the likelihood 
that uninformed investors were influenced by news articles that could be promotional in 
nature was low. 
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